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Abstract
In this paper we investigate corporate investment behavior using a large
panel of Hungarian rms between 1993 and 2002. The standard neoclassi-
cal framework is used to derive empirically feasible specications, however,
several other issues beyond the scope of the framework are also addressed.
We draw on the line of research carried out previously in the Eurosystem
Monetary Transmission Network (EMTN). Our results are, by and large,
similar to those obtained within the EMTN. Namely, the e¤ect of user cost
changes on investment is signicant and robust across several specications
providing strong evidence against simple sales-accelerator models of invest-
ment. Firmscash-ow proved to be a signicant determinant of corporate
investment, which suggests that nancial variables do matter for rms.
JEL classication: C23, D21, D92, E22, E50
Keywords: investment, monetary transmission, user cost of capital, credit
channel, panel data
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1. Introduction
1 Introduction
Understanding investment behavior has been an important topic on the eco-
nomic agenda for some time. Empirical and theoretical models of business
investment has been developing rapidly since the 1960s. The interest and
need for understanding investment behavior emanated from various reasons.
First, it is widely accepted that investment volatility is a prime contribu-
tor to aggregate output uctuations. Also, anemic investment expenditures
might signal various economic problems that might need solutions from eco-
nomic policy makers. While having a clear picture of business investment
characteristics is interesting on its own right, this paper seeks to empiri-
cally investigate corporate investment behavior in order to shed some light
on how monetary impulses are transmitted to the Hungarian nonnancial
corporate sector, namely, to what extent and how business investment reacts
to monetary policy decisions.
However, the implication of our approach is that it is not the existence
of the traditional interest rate channel that is in focus of the paper. The
traditional interest rate channel portrays the transmission of a money supply
shock to investment and output (Mishkin (1996)). Rather, what we intend
to gauge is to what extent changes in the user cost of capital of which the
interest rate is only a determinant a¤ect corporate investment behavior. It
is of high relevance because being a small open economy, Hungary is widely
viewed as a country where the main channel of transmission is the exchange
rate and the role of mechanisms operating via the interest rate level is often
downplayed.
Several previous studies have tried to capture the relationship between in-
terest rates and investment but those using aggregate data have been rather
unsuccessful in this respect. The ambiguity of results and the failure to de-
tect signicant linkages between variables can be attributed to a number of
reasons. First, aggregation itself obscures e¤ects that could otherwise be im-
portant at the rm level and, as a result, signicant parameter estimates are
rarely obtained on aggregate data. Second, the endogeneity of aggregate in-
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vestment and the user cost of capital cause simple OLS parameter estimates
to be inconsistent and good instruments are di¢ cult to nd at the aggregate
level. Third, nancial market imperfections are not taken into account ex-
plicitly in aggregate models of investment, yet their role is widely accepted
in the literature.
Our approach is micro-founded both in the sense of model development
and estimation. Applying a micro-approach provides at least partial solu-
tions to the problems mentioned above. Heterogeneity across rms provides
for large variance of the observations, which can be exploited in the identi-
cation and estimation procedures. Also, endogeneity can be tackled since
good instruments are easier to obtain at the rm level. Financial market
imperfections are also incorporated and its e¤ects are estimated.
This investigation has been carried out as part of a broader project within
the Magyar Nemzeti Bank aimed at mapping various transmission mecha-
nisms of monetary policy. In the current stage, we followed the line of re-
search carried out recently within the Eurosystem Monetary Transmission
Network for two reasons. First, results are derived in a simple but rigorous
framework. Second, they are comparable to outcomes of previous European
studies. Despite its deciencies, we consider the simple neoclassical model
applied in the paper as a good starting point in understanding corporate
investment behavior in Hungary.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section bestows our analysis
in the investment literature and addresses some shortcomings to the neoclas-
sical framework. We also touch on certain other issues that cannot directly
be tackled within the framework though proved to be important. In Section
3 stylized facts are presented along with previous studies of capital formation
in Hungary. The theoretical model is discussed and the optimization problem
of a representative rm is solved in Section 4. Estimable specications are
derived in Section 5. Characteristics of our data and the way we constructed
key variables are presented in Section 6. Our estimation strategy and results
are exhibited in Section 7 and Section 8 concludes. Further data details are
provided in the Appendix.
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2 A brief overview of the investment litera-
ture
The goal of this selective overview is to bestow our analysis in the eld
and present the problems and ndings of previous studies that led to the
extant empirical frameworks in applied investment studies. We start with
discussing the key assumptions and ndings of the neoclassical framework
because prior to Jorgensons model (Jorgenson (1963)), capital demand was
simply considered as a response to uctuations of sales or output1 and no
rigorous framework existed for understanding investment behavior. The sec-
ond part of the section deals with several additional issues which could not
be addressed within the neoclassical framework.
The explicitly dynamic decision problem of the rm was introduced by
Jorgenson (1963). Jorgenson showed that investment was driven by a "shadow
price" or implicit rent of one unit of capital service per period of time. He
called this rent the user cost of capital. He derived the optimal capital stock
under constant returns to scale and exogenously given output. To make the
rate of investment determinate, the model was completed by a distributed
lag function.
While there have been many di¤erent approaches within the neoclassical
framework in understanding investment spending, several issues have repeat-
edly been encountered by researchers. We do not intend to present a complete
list of questions related to the Jorgensonian model but concentrate on the
main issues overviewing previous results.2
First, the assumption of continuous substitutability of the two input fac-
tors implies that the rm is able to adjust its capital stock, be it either
investment or disinvestment. Thus, it can freely increase or decrease its cap-
ital stock until its marginal product is equal to its marginal cost. Rapid
changes in the capital stock are not punishedmeaning that adjustment is
1This approach refers to the sales accelerator investment demand models.
2A comprehensive survey of investment studies up to the beginning of the nineties can
be found in, for example, Chirinko (1993).
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costless in the model. As a consequence, the rm can achieve the optimal
capital stock instantaneously and the decision problem becomes static.3 The
absence of adjustment costs has been challenged many times ever since the
introduction of convex adjustment costs in the rms optimization problem
by Gould (1968). However, taking adjustment costs into account does not
invalidate the Jorgenson condition, it only increases the marginal cost of
capital and introduces dynamics in the optimization problem.
Second, the inharmonious treatment of delivery lags of investment and
the immediate adjustment of optimal capital was another source of criticisms
of the neoclassical framework. Empirical models usually assume that optimal
capital is achieved according to an ADL process. Hence, dynamic adjustment
is introduced in the model, but the particular form of this adjustment process
does not follow from any of the key assumptions. Also, if optimal capital
adjustment is instantaneous, the investment path generated by a delivery
lag distribution may not be optimal. Therefore, the interpretation of lagged
parameter estimates is ambiguous: it is not clear to what extent they describe
adjustment or the e¤ects of past expectations on current investment.
Finally, the treatment of expectations resulted in further criticism of the
neoclassical model. A vast amount of e¤ort has been made to develop and
estimate models which explicitly tackle the problem highlighted by Robert
Lucas in his seminal article (see, for example, Lucas and Prescott (1971),
Muth (1961) for early models). Nevertheless, its practical success and policy
applicability have not been unambiguous. There are various arguments why
the role of explicit models has had so little direct impact on current policy
evaluations. First, as stated by Chirinko (1993), pp. 1900, in its original form
the Lucas critique was user unfriendlyand cast in an unfamiliar technical
language. Also, explicit models performed rather poorly when confronted
with data.
3This is why Hayashi (2000) has called the optimal policy as entirely myopic. In
other words, since capital is a variable factor input, the optimal policy is only to maximize
the current return every moment in time without regard to the future.
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An alternative theory suggested by Tobin (1969) stated that the rate of
investment is a function of the marginal q-value. Marginal q was dened
as the ratio of market value of new additional investment goods to their re-
placement costs. If the rm can freely change its capital stock, adjustment
takes place until the marginal q is equal to 1. In the estimated q-model, the
e¤ects of all lagged variables and the expectations of all relevant future vari-
ables are captured by q. Thus, the e¤ects of delivery lags can be interpreted
as the inuence of lagged expectations of q on investment. While the neo-
classical theory and the q theory had been considered as concurrent models
for a considerable period of time, Hayashi (1982) demonstrated that, under
certain assumptions, the two are equivalent. He also showed that if a rm
is a price-taker and assuming constant returns to scale in both production
and installation, then the (unobservable) marginal q is equal to the average
q, which is the ratio of the market value of the rm to the replacement cost
of its capital stock.
The investment literature of the last three decades has focused on two
other important aspects of investment decisions. The rst issue concerns the
question as to what extent investment decisions are reversible. The second is
related to the timing aspects of investment decisions, namely, how the realis-
tic possibility of postponing current investment a¤ects traditional investment
decision rules. These issues could not been addressed within the neoclassical
framework and gave rise to the "orthodox theory of investment", also called
as "real option approach to investment".
Costs of capital adjustment are augmented when capital can be sold only
at a price considerably lower than its purchase price or cannot be sold at all.
This phenomenon is referred to as the irreversibility of investment. Pindyck
(1991) sets out two main arguments. First, capital is rm or at least industry
specic in most cases and it is not likely that there is a liquid secondary
market at hand. Apart from limited demand, the resale price of capital is
also negatively a¤ected by the fact that the potential buyer is not likely to
use the acquired asset in the same market conditions. If the rm wants to
sell its capital goods, the buyer is likely to face the same market conditions
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in output markets and hence, it might not be worth to buy the asset at all.
The di¤erence between the resale price and the purchase price of capital can
also be signicantly negative if capital is not rm or industry specic. This
di¤erence is generated by asymmetric information between the seller and
the buyer and is referred to as lemon price-e¤ect after Akerlof (1970).4
Because of all these, investment costs are sunk for the rm and do matter in
the optimization problem.
The above problems associated with the irreversibility of investment rise
only in the presence of uncertainty. In the standard neoclassical framework
it is assumed that rms are able to accurately estimate future output prices,
investment prices, costs and interest rates.5 In an uncertain environment,
the possibility to postpone investment becomes valuable. The additional
value is generated by the possibility to wait for new information to arrive.
Postponing investment and waiting provides the rm with a call option of
which the price it takes into account when deciding about investment. If
the rm invests today, it loses the option of investing tomorrow and the
opportunity cost of investing today increases the cost of investment. Pindyck
(1991) pointed out that irreversibility, uncertainty and the possibility to wait
together call for an amendment of the naive net present value rule. That
is, in optimum, the marginal product of capital has to be greater than its
marginal cost. Uncertainty increases the value of waiting (call option) and
decreases the propensity to invest now. Hence, stability and predictability
might be as or even more  important investment incentives as taxes or
interest rates.
4A di¤erence between the purchase and resale price of capital goods might arise even if
these problems are not serious in factor markets. If the transaction costs of selling capital
goods are signicant or comparable to the purchase price, it might not be worth selling
capital goods at all.
5Uncertainty in a broader sense does appear in some early neoclassical models. Yet,
uncertainty is associated with the explicit modeling of expectations in these or, to be
more accurate, with the inability to properly model these expectations. In the context of
our overview, we refer to the uncertainty emerging from the probabilistic nature of future
outcomes of variables which are relevant for the optimizing rm. It is also important in
this context that this is losely associated with the irreversibility of the investment.
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Abel et al. (1996) relaxes the total irreversibility assumption. In their
simple model the rm can resell its capital later but at a price that is not
known at time of the resale decision (expandability). This provides for an-
other possibility called the put option. The option to sell later, which is
associated with the partial irreversibility case, increases the propensity to
invest today. In the end, the optimal decision to invest is determined by
these two options.
Adjustment costs, uncertainty, irreversibility and expandability are not
explicit in our model. One might argue that this makes our analysis very
simplied and unrealistic but the neoclassical framework is a clear and rig-
orous starting point in understanding corporate investment behavior. Also,
it is relatively easy to derive empirically testable hypotheses in this frame-
work. Moreover, the recent research in the European Monetary Transmission
Network used similar framework so comparing our conclusions to previous
results is straightforward.
3 Business cycle and investment in Hungary
Stylized facts
3.1 Previous studies of investment and capital
To our knowledge, two former investigations carried out capital stock es-
timation on Hungarian data. Both studies of capital formation produced
similar conclusions both in qualitative and quantitative terms (Figure 1).
Pula (2003) estimated aggregate investment (corporate plus public) series
using Central Statistics O¢ ce (CSO) survey data. He used CSO data only
on investments put into operation6 in his calculations. Our calculation ap-
proach is similar to that of Pula (2003) in the sense that we derive investment
6In CSO terminology, investments put into operation are investments brought into
proper use, as well as their part independently put into use.
8
3. Business cycle and investment in HungaryStylized facts
using changes in balance sheet capital data, that is, we accounted for only
activated investment.
Figure 1: Investment rate series of previous studies
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However, there are two di¤erences that may account for the gap between
our series and that of Pula (2003). First, his dataset consisted of rms
employing more than 5 persons on average while our dataset is somewhat
broader as will be seen in the dataset description. Second, CSO surveys
xed capital formation which covers the purchase and production of new
tangible assets. On the contrary, we used balance sheet data on intangibles
as well. These di¤erences might explain why our investment rate is higher.
Yet, despite di¤erences, the two imply similar conclusions regarding both the
level and the dynamics of investment.
The other study by Darvas and Simon (2000) produced aggregate invest-
ment broadly similar to that of Pula. However, they used investment7 data
7Investment comprises new acquisition, establishment, production of new tangible as-
sets, the expansion, change of the function, conversion, reconstruction of existing tangible
assets, the substitution of which were used up, with the exclusion of cultivation, mainte-
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instead of investments put into operation. Further discussion of previous
results can be found in Pula (2003).
3.2 Determinants of Hungarian investment
As regards macroeconomic conditions, the rst few years of the 1990s was
characterized with volatile ination, real interest rates and an appreciating
real exchange rate. The macroeconomic environment was rather unstable.
This instability emanated largely from the structural changes which were
induced by the transition process. To avoid loss of competitiveness stem-
ming from adjustments in market prices, policy makers recurrently decided
to realign the nominal exchange rate, which, in turn fuelled ination expec-
tations. Without these exchange rate adjustments, however, the huge cur-
rent account decit inherited from the 1980s would have caused the already
heavy debt burden to increase further. Also, economic policy faced pressing
reforms on the scal side. Against this backdrop came the comprehensive
economic reform package in 1995, which eliminated economic imbalances and
promoted macroeconomic consolidation afterwards. As an immediate result
of the measures, both the budget and the current account decit halved,
which obviously was a favorable consequence. However, economic growth
and investment dampened at the same time.
In light of these events it is not surprising that investment activity was
more intense in the second half of the period under investigation. The onset of
the 1990s was the very time of the transition to market economy when rms
were driven to remarkably revaluate their capital stock as existing capital
goods inherited from the planned economy had become obsolete.
This is reected in the fact that the investment rate peaked after the mid-
dle 1990s. In these years (1997-1998), foreign direct investment culminated,
pumping heavy inows of fresh capital to the Hungarian corporate sector and
fuelling buoyant investment activity.
nance and renewal of the natural forests. The continuous maintenance and repair of the
tangible are not part of investment.
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From 1999 onwards, the slightly decreasing but still stable investment
rate suggests companies might begin to foresee their deteriorating prot op-
portunities with the nearing recession and they gradually began to refrain
from actively investing in new capital goods and, accordingly, rather accu-
mulated cash-ow. This can be seen from the increasing cash-ow-to-capital
ratio. However, the increase in the investment rate in 2002 supports the view
that although some slack in economic activity could still be felt that year
Hungarian rms engaged in heavy investment at the end of 2002. These
developments in the business cycle can be also tracked down looking at the
growth rate of output: the decrease in average output in 1995 was followed
by rapid recovery in the next three years; then, after another two years of
high growth (1998-1999), output grew at a lower pace in 2001-2002.
Figure 2: Investment, User Cost, Cash Flow and Growth of Sales*
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*To replicate macro data, we used K(t-1) as weights to calculate averages of I(t)/K(t-1) and
CF(t)/K(t-1). For the growth rate of Q, weights are Q(t-1) values. Since it is not evident
what variable one should use calculating a weighted average of the user cost, we present
hereafter the unweighted averages of the user cost of capital and its components.
As we will see in Section 4, theoretical results enforce the intuition that
user cost developments are primary determinants of investment behavior.
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Therefore, we found it instructive to analyze how each of its components
evolved in our sample period. Several ndings emerge when breaking down
the user cost of capital. First, the average cost of capital exhibited moder-
ate volatility throughout the period. In 1993-94, it fell slightly below 15%.
However, already in the rst year of the macroeconomic stabilization (1995),
when scal reforms and a new monetary regime8 were introduced, the user
cost increased to over 20% and went down under 20% only at the end of the
nineties and in 2002. Driving forces behind these movements are analyzed
below (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).
Figure 3: Average User Cost of Capital and its after-tax components I
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The most obvious e¤ect on the cost of capital was put out by changes
in the interest rate level.9 1994 saw a rise in the interest rate level but
this rise was not reected in the cost of capital because other factors, e.g.
8Crawling peg exchange rate regime with a one-o¤ initial devaluation of the national
currency (9%).
9Interest rates are generally deemed as the opportunity cost of investing in physical
capital goods.
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Figure 4: Average User Cost of Capital and its after-tax components II
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investment price movements, counterbalanced the elevating e¤ect of interest
rates. However, interest rate e¤ects were prevalent in 1995 when a sharp
rise in the interest rate level increased the cost of capital. From 1996 on,
the continuously declining interest rates permanently pushed the user cost
of capital downwards. The only exception was 2001 when rates remained
stable.
Another important factor determining the costs of capital holders is in-
vestment price ination. Investment prices a¤ect capital owners via two
terms. The rst is the rate of change in investment prices, the other is the
investment price level relative to the output price level. As investment prices
increase, capital owners realize these price gains. As prices decrease, they suf-
fer a loss on their assets. Investment price ination showed a rather smooth
path during the period under investigation. Investment price growth acceler-
ated in the rst two years of our sample period and have been decreasing ever
since with the exception of 1999. The continuous decline might be explained
by the general downward ination trend in the economy. The deceleration in
13
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investment price ination had an elevating e¤ect on the cost of capital, that
is, the slower upward investment price movements from the middle 1990s
ever reduced the price-gains capital goods holders realized throughout the
period. In 1999, however, a temporary price hike took place reinforcing the
downward pressure falling interest rates already put on the user cost. These
two e¤ects seem to have been strong enough to be apparent in the diminishing
average cost of capital in 1999.
The price of investment relative to output also plays a role. It shows how
dear investment goods are compared to nal goods. This relative price term
exhibited a slowly abating pattern in the period under review except that
it fell sharply in 1995. This slightly downward trend exerted a diminishing
e¤ect on the user cost throughout the whole period.
Changes in corporate tax rates also play a role in user cost developments.
Tax changes may inuence the user cost via various mechanisms. First, a
tax cut increases the after-tax output price, which in turn makes investment
cheaper relative to the (after-tax) value of output. This implies that a tax
cut in itself makes investment more attractive. Second, a tax cut reduces
the tax savings on paid interest leading to higher after-tax interest rates
and, therefore, higher opportunity cost of investment. Third, as deprecia-
tion is also tax-deductible, a cut in corporate taxes reduces tax advantages
of the depreciation write-o¤ bringing about a higher after-tax depreciation
rate. Since losses in the value of capital assets is borne by capital owners,
a rise in the depreciation rate directly augments the cost of capital. Hun-
garian corporate tax rates were cut two times in the 1990s. The rst, four
percentage point, cut took place 1994 (40% to 36%). This change was not
reected in the average e¤ective tax rate because of the e¤ects of various tax
credits and because the rate of companies una¤ected by the tax cut that is,
enjoying total tax exemption was quite high throughout the decade (more
than 30%). However, the more drastic shift in 1995 halving the rate to 18%
had a measurable e¤ect. The e¤ective tax rate remained stable in the rest of
the decade.
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4 Theoretical framework
4.1 The neoclassical model of investment
The decision problem we exhibit is fairly standard in the literature10. The
representative rm chooses capital, labor, and nancing structure over an
innite horizon. We assume a CES production function where the two inputs,
capital and labor can be continuously substituted. A general form of this
technology can be written as
Qit = F (Kit; Lit) = Ait
h
K
 1

it + (1  )L
 1

it
i 
 1
(1)
where Qit is output (value added), Kit is capital stock, Lit is employment,
Ait is the Solow residual,  and (1  ) are shares of the two inputs,  is
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor,  is the degree of
homogeneity or the volumen elasticity. In the case of homogenous technology
this latter parameter is equal to unity but we do not restrict  to be unity.
The production function is twicely continuously di¤erentiable with
FK (t) > 0; FL (t) > 0; FKK (t) < 0 and FLL (t) < 0
That is, the function is strictly monotonous in both capital and labor with
decreasing returns to scale in both factors.
Firm i chooses the two inputs and nancing structure in time t so as to
maximize the present value of future prots:
maxWit =
Z 1
t=0
e(
R t
p=0 rpdp)itdt (2)
10Apparently, there are di¤erences across studies in terms of the objective function and
the budget constraint. The two most standard objective functions are the market value
of the rm, that is, the value of shares and the rms prot function. They are essentially
lead to the same results as prot determines the value of the rm. Certain studies specify
these functions in continuous-time, while others exhibit discrete-time versions of the prob-
lem. There are also di¤erences as to what components enter the prot function. Some
studies incorporate the e¤ects of dividends or investment tax credit, some others do not.
Nevertheless, these studies model investment on a very similar theoretical basis.
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where Wit is the market value of the rm, Bit is the value of external funds,
rt is the market interest rate or discount rate and it is prots. The problem
has two limiting constraints.
The rst constraint is the budget constraint of the rm stating that ex-
penses can exceed revenues by the amount of borrowed funds:
it = (1  uit) [pstF (Kit; Lit)  witLit   iitBit]+uititpIstKit+ _Bit pIstIit (3)
where uit is the e¤ective tax rate, pst is the price of output, wit is the price
of unit of labor (i.e. wage cost), iit is the interest paid on outstanding bank
credits, pIst is the industry specic investment price index, it is the rate of
depreciation and Iit is the investment volumen. As it can be seen from the
above formula, depreciation and paid interest is tax deductible in the model.
We note here that the interest rate is assumed to be positively correlated
to the amount of funds borrowed. This is because higher amount of funds
borrowed increases the risk of default and banks expect higher compensation
for this increased risk in the form of higher interest rates. However, it is
negatively correlated to the amount of capital since a rm with relatively
high proportion of valuable assets is less likely to be non performing on
its liabilities. In what follows, we assume that the spread charged by banks
(risk premium) for the increased default risk is simply a function of the rms
leverage:
iit = iit

Bit
pIstKit

, where i0it > 0. (4)
For the optimal debt/capital ratio to be unique, a su¢ cient condition is
2i0it +
Bit
pIstK
i00it > 0.
The second constraint is the capital accumulation equation11:
_Kit = Iit   itKit (5)
11We assume that the accounting rate of depreciation is equal to the economic rate of
depreciation.
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We note here that assumptions about the rate of depreciation have im-
portant consequences with respect to the nal specications of the model. In
the literature it is common to assume that the rate of depreciation is constant
over time and across rms. However, many critiques called this hypothesis
into question (e.g. Chirinko (1993)). The constant depreciation hypothesis
is likely to be erroneous also in the case of Hungary. The modernization
of the production technologies and the incursion of ICT in the production
made existing capital assets less and less valuable and implied continuously
increasing depreciation rate during the catching up process. These consider-
ations call for a depreciation rate which varies over time. By the same token,
it can be argued that it is unlikely that capital assets in di¤erent industries
are subject to the same rate of depreciation. It is more reasonable to assume
that this rate is heterogenous across industries or rms. Drawing on these,
we assume that the rate of depreciation is both time and rm specic as
shown in equations (3) and (5).12
4.2 Optimality conditions
Substituting eq. (3) and eq. (5) into eq. (2) and di¤erentiating with respect
to the decision variables we arrive at the rst order necessary conditions
(FONC). The FONC for the external funds gives the following equation:
rt   (1  uit) iit = (1  uit) Bit
pIsiKit
i0it (6)
This condition states that the optimal leverage is a result of counter-
weighting tax advantages of taking on more credit against the increasing
interest burden caused by higher leverage. Since the right hand side of the
equation is per denitionem positive, the after tax e¤ective interest rate is
smaller than the discount rate in optimum. As we will see later, the cost
of capital is determined by the weighted average of these two latter inter-
est rates. Hence, the access to bank credit and the related tax advantages
12Nevertheless, our derivations are invariant to this assumption. It only plays a role
when deriving empirically estimable equations.
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(tax-deductibility of interest paid) reduce the e¤ective cost of investment and
thereby increase the demand for capital. The FONC for the capital stock
gives
(1  uit) pstFK (Kit; Lit) = pIstrt+pIstit (1  uit)  _pIst+(1  uit)
@iit
@Kit
Bit (7)
After rearranging and plugging eq. (6) into eq. (7), the Jorgenson con-
dition is obtained, which states that, in optimum, the marginal product of
capital is equal to its marginal cost, that is, the user cost:
FK (Kit; Lit) = UCit (8)
where
UCit =
pIst
pst (1  uit)

1  Bit
pIstKit

rt +

Bit
pIstKit

(1  uit) iit
  _p
I
st
pIst
+ (1  uit) it
 (9)
If we abstract from borrowing possibilities and taxes (Bit = 0; uit = 0),
the formula for the user cost becomes the one published by Hall and Jorgen-
son (1967). Taking borrowing possibilities and tax aspects of the optimiza-
tion into account, one arrives at the denition of Hayashi (2000).
4.3 E¤ects of monetary policy on investment
In this model, economic policy exerts its inuence on corporate investment
behavior via the user cost of capital. Tax policies are captured by the rm
specic e¤ective tax rate, which directly inuences the cost of capital. Mon-
etary policy, however, does not have a direct e¤ect on the user cost. To
highlight the role of monetary policy in this model, we can think of the
mechanism as a three step process. In this process, each step is embodied by
a partial elasticity parameter. We have to stress here that this decomposition
is valid only if we stipulate in each step the all-else-equalcondition. That
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is, if we consider the ceteris paribus e¤ects of changes in variables. Minding
this, we can write the decomposition as
"Km = "
K
UC  "UCr  "rm
where "Km is the elasticity of the capital stock with respect to the monetary
policy interest rate. This is what concerns monetary policy makers at the
end of the day. "KUC is the elasticity of the capital stock with respect to the
user cost of capital, "UCr is the elasticity of the user cost with respect to the
market interest rate and "rm is the elasticity of the market interest rate with
respect to the policy interest rate.
The mechanism via which monetary policy a¤ects the capital stock is
then straightforward. First, a change in the policy rate causes market rates
to change, which in turn feeds into the user cost of capital. However, a few
considerations are in order here.
First, it is not short but long term rates that determine the cost of capital
since investment-related credits are typically of long maturity. Hence, long
interest rates are taken into account in the user cost of capital. Second, it
is not necessarily true that short term policy rate changes are spread across
all market interest rates and maturities. According to the expectation hy-
pothesis of the yield curve, long term interest rates are averages of expected
values of future short term rates. If monetary policy and economic policy in
general is credible then short rate changes are not necessarily reected in long
term interest rates. A preemptive monetary tightening intended to prevent
the economy from overheating might leave long rates unchanged just because
it makes future tightening unnecessary. This is reected in unchanged ex-
pectations of future interest rates and, as a consequence, investment might
not react to a tightening just because the relevant interest rates have not
changed. In this setup, one would wrongly conclude that monetary policy
cannot curb investment activity. Third, if rms nance investment directly
from capital markets via, e.g., bond issuance, then monetary impulses might
be transmitted to market interest rates more e¢ ciently compared to a situa-
tion when the primary source of nancing investment is provided by banks.
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In the latter case, if banks are not competing heavily to nance rms, they
are less motivated to reduce the price of credit in the case of a loosening.
This is the case also, when the key determinant of credit supply is not the
central bank.13
In the next step, long term interest rates inuence the user cost of capital.
Since interest rates are part of the user cost, the direct e¤ect of interest rates
on the user cost can be derived analytically from the user cost denition. We
emphasize that this e¤ect corresponds to the elasticity "UCr presented above
if and only if changes in interest rates do not a¤ect other variables in the
user cost denition. Assuming that banks adjust permanently their lending
interest rates by the same percentage as market rates change, the direct e¤ect
on rms user cost of one percent change in long term interest rate
 
"UCr

is
nothing else than the weight of interest rates in the user cost denition, that
is:
"UCr =
pI
p(1 u)
h
1  B
pIK

r +

B
pIK

(1  u) i
i
UC
(10)
This is how the total e¤ect of changes in interest rates on the user cost
is generally simplied in the empirical investment literature (see for example
Chatelain et al. (2001) or Butzen et al. (2001)). However, the elasticity of
user cost w.r.t. market rates depends on other components of the user cost
as well. These are not present in the numerator above. Namely, it is the
sign and the magnitude of p
I
(1 u)p
h
(1  u)    _pI
pI
i
that matters. This suggest
that, holding all other variables constant, higher expected investment price
ination implies higher user cost response to market rate change. Hence, if
expected investment price ination exceeds the after-tax depreciation rate,
the fraction at stake is on average higher than 1, which should be the case
in most countries with high ination.
The user cost elasticity w.r.t. market rates can be simplied to the expres-
sion (10) only if other variables in the user cost denition are kept unchanged.
While this assumption is reasonable in the short run, it is certainly ctitious
13One may think of, for example, to capital inow from foreign investors here
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and unrealistic in the long run. First of all, changes in interest rates may
change the relative costs of nancing new acquisitions by debt or equity. Ac-
cording to eq. (4), the rms leverage is a function of the di¤erence between
the market interest rate and the after tax interest rate. If this latter expres-
sion changes, the rm might readjust its debt/equity ratio in the long run so
as to regain to optimum. Thus, market rates a¤ect rmsleverage, which in
turn a¤ect apparent borrowing rates and hence rmsuser cost. The elastic-
ity of user cost with respect to the market rate is thus lower than it would be
without the possibility of choosing the nancing structure of new investment.
In other words, the ability to adjust its leverage gives the rm the ability to
attenuate interest rate shocks. Secondly, interest rate changes may inuence
investment price ination and also the relative price of investment to output
prices. These e¤ects are much more di¢ cult to quantify and are far beyond
the focus of this paper.
In the last step, rms facing di¤erent user cost outcomes react and adjust
their capital stock accordingly. The aim of the empirical models presented
below is to gauge this phase. Estimating "KUC answers the question how
responsive is the stock of capital to changes in the user cost of capital.
The specications presented hereafter can be used to capture e¤ects of
nancial market imperfections, which give rise to an additional monetary
transmission channel. Before presenting what these e¤ects stem from and
how they are measured, we describe how we derived empirically feasible equa-
tions from theoretical ones.
5 Empirical models
With the optimality conditions at hand, one needs empirically feasible equa-
tions. One way to obtain estimable specications is to substitute the partial
derivative of the CES function in eq. (1) with respect to capital into eq. (8)
and take logs (small letters represent logs). After rearranging, the following
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long-run demand for capital is obtained:
kit =

 +
1  


qit   ucit +  log () +    1

log (Ait) + "it (11)
To be able to perform econometric tests on our model we assumed that
the Solow residual can be decomposed into a rm specic and a time specic
term: Ait = A
1
i A
2
t . In the case of equation (11) this decomposition means
that the last two terms of the right hand side ( log () + log (Ait) (   1) =)
can be broken down to an idiosyncratic xed e¤ect (i) and a time specic
e¤ect (t).
Obviously, the long-run optimum stock of capital (kit) is unobservable,
hence we have to characterize the adjustment process of capital. We assume,
following others (e.g. Angeloni et al. (2002), Chatelain and Tiomo (2001),
Valderrama (2001)), that capital adjustment can be described using its own
previous values and the lags of the user cost and the output. The autore-
gressive distributed lag equation derived in this manner serves as the basis
of our econometric analysis in which (p; q) are the parameters of the ADL
specication:
kit =
pX
p=1
!pki;t p +
qX
q=1
qqi;t q +
qX
q=1
quci;t q + i + t + "it (12)
22
5. Empirical models
Using this equation, one can derive the long run parameters of the user
cost and output14:
LT =
Pq
q=1 q
1 Ppp=1 !p and LT =
Pq
q=1 q
1 Ppp=1 !p (13)
Introducing long run parameters disentangles the apparent inconsistency
between the optimal capital demand and ADL specications. Neoclassical
theory assumed instantaneous adjustment of the optimal capital stock. This
obviously contradicts to specifying an ADL adjustment process in empirical
equations. Assuming that capital adjustment can be characterized by its own
previous values and lags of other variables points to the presumption that
frictions in factor markets are at work. While immediate capital adjustment
is clearly an unrealistic assumption, supposing frictionless markets over the
long run, or rather, assuming rms are able to adjust their capital to the
new optimum level after several years, may be more plausible. This implies,
in turn, that long run parameter estimates can be paralleled with long run
frictionlessness in factor markets because these parameters embody e¤ects
after adjustment in volumes and prices have taken place. Hence, long run
parameter estimates can be closely related to those of the capital demand
equation (11).
In this framework, an additional channel of monetary policy transmission
can be captured. This channel is generated by nancial market frictions and
is called the credit channel in the investment literature (see e.g. Mishkin
(1996)).
14We note here that eq. (12) is a reduced form of some underlying model of the capital
stock. Hence, in this specication partial elasticities and, also, long-run parameters em-
body the e¤ects of both expectations and technology parameters that are not explicitly
specied in the model. Therefore, one should exercise caution when interpreting parameter
estimates as pure adjustment characteristics. Despite the problem has long been known,
it is not yet a wide-spread practice in applied investment research to tackle these issues
explicitly (see, for example, Abel and Blanchard (1986), Chirinko (1993) or Angeloni et al.
(2002)). Since we intend to produce parameter estimates that are derived in a comparable
framework in order to evaluate our results with respect to previous European studies of
investment, we did not address these issues in this paper. We refer the interested reader
to the Lucas crtitique mentioned in the model overview and the survey of Chirinko (1993).
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Studies of the credit channel and, as part of it, the balance sheet chan-
nel, are based on the observation that the classic hypothesis of Modigliani
and Miller is not valid. That is, external and internal sources of funds are
not perfect substitutes for the rm. In this view a wedge arises between
the cost of these funds in capital markets because of market imperfections
such as asymmetric information, agency problems, moral hazard and adverse
selection. These imperfections bring about a transmission channel which tra-
ditional models could not capture. At the centre of these arguments is the
statement that a rm with a smaller net worth is more exposed to the ef-
fects of adverse selection and moral hazard and the supply of external funds
is inelastic. This is because the only information available for creditors to
judge whether a rm is a timely and reliably solvent borrower is its net
worth. A rm with a smaller net worth is less able to cover its liabilities
in the event of a default and, as a consequence, creditors are less willing to
provide nancing. Thus, asymmetric information in nancial markets make
certain rms nancially constrained. The moral hazard aspect of asymmet-
ric information, in turn, is highlighted by the owners willingness to take on
risks. When their share in the rm is smaller the potential loss they face
is smaller and hence, their propensity to launch riskier investment projects
is greater. Riskier projects are obviously more likely to fail and therefore,
if the nancial leverage of a rm increases it causes creditors propensity to
nance to dampen. Thus, asymmetric information drives a wedge between
the rm specic interest rate and the market rate. In other words, rms nd
it cheaper to invest out of retained earnings than out of borrowed funds. This
implies, in turn, that those investment projects yielding the market rate will
not be executed because the cost of nancing in these cases is greater than
the internal rate of return of the project. This is an important implication
since, absent information asymmetries, these models would be economically
justied to execute. Put it another way, the understanding the e¤ects of these
phenomena is important because they have serious economic consequences:
their existence may lead to the misallocation of resources.
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In this framework, monetary policy can inuence rmsbalance sheets
in several ways. A monetary loosening, for example, causes share prices to
rise which directly diminishes the e¤ects of the above mentioned information
problems. The approach of measuring the e¤ect monetary policy exerts on
rmsbalance sheet directly is called the nancial accelerator approach. This
investigates whether weak balance sheets of rms amplify monetary policy
shocks on rm spending (see Vermeulen (2000) for an empirical investiga-
tion).
Mishkin (1996) puts forward an argument also for indirect monetary pol-
icy e¤ects in this context. He argues that monetary policy exerts its inuence
on investment via the price level and ination. Since credit agreements are
contracted in nominals, a shock in ination diminishes the real burden borne
by borrowers. However, the real value of assets of the borrower does not
diminish because it is determined by supply side factors. Moreover, changes
in the nominal interest rate modies rmscash-ow having direct e¤ects on
investment for the nancially constrained rms.
Since the publication of the seminal paper of Fazzari et al. (1988) it is
usual to control for these nancial constrains by entering cash-ow in the
regressions. Fazzari et al. (1988) originally applied cash-ow as a proxy for
the rmsown funds to control for its e¤ects on investment. However, using
cash ow as a proxy for own funds in equations similar to 12 might give
rise to multicollinearity, since cash-ow is correlated to future prots and
future protability (Chatelain et al. (2001), Vermeulen (2000)). Yet, extant
rm-level databasescross-section dimension provides for a huge amount of
observations which mitigates the multicollinearity problem.
The cash-ow augmented equation is:
kit =
pX
p=1
!pki;t p+
qX
q=1
qqi;t q+
qX
q=1
quci;t q+
qX
q=1
CFi;t q
pIs;t qKi;t q 1
+i+t+"it (14)
One might argue that this specication is not a proper one because it
is not the control variable  investment or the investment ratio , but the
optimal capital stock that enters eq. (14). To have the control variable
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(Iit=Ki;t 1) in the empirical model (14) we usekit = ln (Iit=Ki;t 1   it + 1),
which can be calculated from the discrete version of the capital accumulation
equation (5). Approximating the right hand side of this latter equation with
its rst order Taylor series, we arrive at
kit =
Iit
Ki;t 1
  it
This equation says that capital stock changes are an overall result of in-
vestment and depreciation. When investment is equal to the loss of value
in the capital stock the real capital stock does not change and there is no
net e¤ect of investment. This is usually called replacement investment. If
investment is greater (lower) than the depreciation value, the real capital
stock increases (decreases) and investment has a positive (negative) net ef-
fect on the capital stock. Let ~Iit denote replacement investment and I^it net
investment. Then, the overall investment is Iit = ~Iit + I^it.
This distinction between replacement investment and net investment is
quite common in the literature (Chirinko (1993), Letterie and Pfann (2003)).
However it is not so common to address this distinction explicitly in estimated
equations. To be more accurate, equation (14) species net changes in the
real capital stock, while equations explaining the ratio of investment with
respect to capital typically try to explain overall investment. This can be
done using the simplifying assumption of constant rate of depreciation. How-
ever, if this latter condition does not seem to hold, which is likely in our case
(see considerations after the capital accumulation equation in Section 4), the
investment rate specication should be modied.
To see this, suppose that capital adjusts according to an ADL(2,1) struc-
ture. Subtracting ki;t 1 from both sides of equation (14) and using the pre-
vious relationships kit =
Iit
Ki;t 1
  it and and knowing that
~Iit
Ki;t 1
= it,
we have that
I^it
Ki;t 1
= (!1   1) I^it 1
Ki;t 2
+ (!1 + !2   1) ki;t 2 +
Pq
q=1 qqi;t q
+
Pq
q=1 quci;t q +
Pq
q=1
CFi;t q
pIs;t qKi;t q 1
+ i + t + "it
(15)
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As we have already mentioned, most of the studies assume that the rate of
depreciation, that is, the rate of replacement investment, is constant. In this
case, net investment rate could be replaced by overall investment rate in eq.
(15) and standard estimation methods can be applied using
Iit
Ki;t 1
only, as
the constant depreciation rate cancels out due to di¤erencing. This is done
by, for example, Chatelain and Tiomo (2001). If the constant depreciation
assumption does not seem to hold, that is, the depreciation rate depends on
both i and t, the two are not equivalent.
Another specication we estimated is a modied version of eq. (15).
This equation is obtained by rst di¤erencing eq. (14), using the Taylor-
approximation described above and plugging the level of cash ow to this
di¤erenced equation. Consequently, net investment is explained by its lagged
value(s), the di¤erence of output and user cost and the level of cash-ow. As
a result, rm-specic xed e¤ects cancel out and the equation is:
I^it
Ki;t 1
=
Pp
p=1 !p
I^i;t p
Ki;t p 1
+
Pq
q=1 qqi;t q +
Pq
q=1 quci;t q
+
Pq
q=1
CFi;t q
pIs;t qKi;t q 1
+t +"it
(16)
Equations similar to eq. (16) were estimated by von Kalckreuth (2001).
However, there is an important di¤erence between eq. (16) and the one in von
Kalckreuth (2001). In his estimations a xed e¤ect is added to the di¤erenced
equation. He argues in favour of this specication that not only the produc-
tivity level but also its growth rate might be rm specic. This would mean
that rms were able to achieve signicantly di¤erent productivity growth at
the individual level even during a short estimation period. This assumption
is not quite common in the literature and it seems especially strong in our
case in light of the short timespan of our panel. Also, if xed e¤ects were
present in the di¤erenced equation (16), using standard di¤erence-based es-
timators, such as Anderson-Hsiaos or Arrelano-Bond GMM, would lead to
di¤erencing twice and hence would result in further loss of observations.
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6 The data
Our database consists of the corporate tax returns of double entry book
keeping rms between 1992 and 2002. However, the investment ratio is stable
and credible only from 1993 so we did not use data in 1992 for the analysis.15
We excluded several groups from the analysis: nancial intermediaries,
rms in public administration, compulsory social security and education,
rms in health and social work and private households with employed per-
sons.
We also ltered out missing observations for employees, capital and de-
preciation for the whole database. Where enough information was available,
we corrected false data. Using the last two variables we constructed real cap-
ital stock for estimation purposes. The steps of this calculation are presented
in the next subsection.
We reduced the database further because we thought very small rms
investment behavior is signicantly di¤erent from other rms. We found
that very small rmstax return data are imperfect and unreliable in many
cases. Hence, we excluded rms where the number of employees was lower
than two. We also excluded observations where the number of employees
was lower than ve in three consecutive years. As a result, rms in the nal
sample with number of employees greater than two and smaller than ve in
a specic year employ more than ve in the previous two or the next two
years. Thereby we excluded the smallest rms while best preserved the panel
structure of our data.
We cleaned the other variables on the reduced sample. We corrected for
false data using the following rules:
 If the calculated real capital stock is negative,
 If sales revenue is negative,
 If the calculated user cost is negative,
15This suggests that capital revaluations during and after the transition period had still
been in process in 1992.
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Table 1: Number of observations
Year Number of firmsin the population
Number of firms
in the analysis
Number of
omitted firms in
per cent of the
population
1993 66 409 18 729 72%
1994 79 794 22 660 72%
1995 90 726 24 447 73%
1996 105 728 26 495 75%
1997 120 480 29 214 76%
1998 130 835 32 835 75%
1999 139 141 35 563 74%
2000 151 913 37 478 75%
2001 184 703 39 406 79%
2002 199 798 42 023 79%
Total number of
observations 1 269 527 308 850 76%
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 If the depreciation rate is greater than 1,
 If the debt to assets ratio is greater than 1.
We also checked for outliers. For the cash-ow
 
CFit=p
I
stKi;t 1

, depreci-
ation rate (it), logarithm of user cost (logUCit) we dened threshold values
each year as the 1stst and 99th percentiles of the distribution. For the invest-
ment rate (Iit=Ki;t 1) these values were the 1st and 95th percentiles. For the
change in the capital stock ( logKit), change in sales ( logQit), the change
in the user cost ( logUCit) and the change in employment ( logLit) we
used the Chebyshev method: an observation was considered to be outlier
if the absolute deviation of a variable from its mean in a specic year was
greater than ve times its standard deviation: jyit   ytj > 4 sdt (yit).
As a result of all this, our unbalanced panel consists of 73,649 rmsdata
between 1993 and 2002 with 308,850 observations. After industry- and size-
based ltering the size of the database collapsed to 31% of the initial data
set. The nal number of observations is 78% of this smaller database, which
is 24% of the whole population.16
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables used, 1993-2002
Variable Mean Sd. Minimum 25% Median 75% Maximum
I/K 0.437 0.704 -0.603 0.037 0.175 0.541 5.724
logK 8.911 1.999 0.989 7.572 8.783 10.137 19.857
logQ 10.477 1.545 -0.144 9.427 10.393 11.399 19.829
logUC -1.750 0.918 -11.764 -2.038 -1.665 -1.313 -0.301
CF/K 0.734 2.686 -14.990 -0.002 0.224 0.846 58.329
The descriptives of variables used in the analysis are summarized in Table
2, denitions and further details are provided in the appendix. Out of these,
we give a detailed presentation of our capital stock and user cost data in the
next subsection.
16Obviously, the nal number of observations used in the estimations varied because
di¤erent number of lags of variables were needed at di¤erent specications.
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6.1 Capital stock
We encountered several problems measuring the capital stock. We deemed
capital stock as the sum of tangibles and intangibles. Ideally, components of
the capital stock should be registered on market prices. However, according
to Hungarian accounting rules, the capital stock enters the balance sheet on
book value and the amount of depreciation also should be accounted against
book value. If the market value of the capital asset on the rms balance
sheet di¤ers from its book value, the rm can decide whether it adjusts the
value of the capital assets registered on its books. Furthermore, we have no
information on the composition and age structure of the rm specic capital
stock. Putting all this together, we are given a capital stock which is an
amalgam of capital assets with di¤erent age and valued at di¤erent prices.
Hence, raw capital stock data cannot be considered to be valued either at
current or constant prices.
We therefore compiled capital stock data using the idea of the perpetual
inventory method (PIM). The idea behind the PIM is that having an initial
condition, the capital accumulation equation can be used to construct the
stock of capital.
Kit =
tX
j=0
g (t; i) Ii;t j (17)
where Kit is the after-depreciation real capital stock at the end of each
year, Iit is real investment in year t and g (t; i) is a function that species
the depreciation of the extant capital stock and new investment. The above
equation says that the capital stock can be calculated if we know the initial
stock and the net e¤ect of investment and depreciation. If Kit is net invest-
ment cumulated up to period (t  1), that is, the before-depreciation capital
stock in time t, then the capital stock in time t is
Kit = (1  it)Ki;t 1 + Iit (18)
This is nothing but the discrete version of the continuous capital accu-
mulation equation (5) dened in the dynamic optimization problem of the
31
6. The data
rm. We dened the initial condition of the capital stock as the value in the
year the rm entered the database and expressed it in 1992 prices.
To calculate the real capital stock we needed rm-level investment data.
We used capital stock data registered according to accounting rules because
the database did not contain data on investment directly. We refer to this
capital stock data as accounting capital. Investment is calculated based
on eq. (18): it is equal to the after-depreciation di¤erence between the
accounting capital stock in year t and (t  1):
pIstIit = Kit   Ki;t 1 + it Ki;t 1 = Kit   Ki;t 1 +DEPit (19)
where
 
pIstIit

is nominal investment, Kit is accounting capital at the end
of year t and DEPit is the value of depreciation write-o¤ in year t. Then,
deating investment with the industry specic investment price index
 
pIst

,
we arrive at investment volume (Iit).
With the knowledge of the initial condition we can construct rm level real
capital stock using real investment and the depreciation rate. Our database
only contains year-end data, which causes another measurement problem. If
we dene the e¤ective rate of depreciation as the ratio of accounted depre-
ciation in year t and the accounting capital stock of the previous year-end 
it = DEPit= Ki;t 1

, we apparently overestimate the realistic depreciation
rate for actively investing rms. This is due to the fact that investment as
well as disinvestment occurs throughout the whole year seriously a¤ecting
accounted depreciation. If a rm invests, it can account an amount of depre-
ciation already in the year of investment and, correspondingly, in the case of
disinvestment it can benet from registering the value of depreciation up to
the point of disinvestment. To avoid unrealistically high depreciation rates
we assume that investment occurs at the beginning of each year and disin-
vestment occurs at the end of each year. The capital accumulation equation
and the depreciation rate in the two cases is the following:
1. in case of investment (Iit > 0), it =
DEPit
DEPit + Kit
and
Kit = (1  it) (Ki;t 1 + Iit), because the total capital stock against
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which the rm writes o¤ depreciation is the stock after investment at
the 1st of January, and
2. in case of disinvestment (Iit < 0), it =
DEPit
Kit
and
Kit = (1  it)Ki;t 1 + Iit
We might assume, as an alternative, that investment and disinvestment
takes place in the middle of the year. In this case the rm writes o¤ half
of its depreciation on the new investment and half of its depreciation on the
disinvestment kept for six months. Hence, without regard to the sign of Iit,
the depreciation rate and the capital stock at the end of the year can be
calculated as
it =
DEPit
DEPit + Kit + Ki;t 1
and Kit = (1  it)Ki;t 1 +

1  it
2

Iit:
We carried out our estimations using variables calculated in this manner but
results were robust to these modication. Therefore, these results are not
published in this paper.
6.2 User cost
Following equation (9) in the derivation, we dened the user cost as
UCit =
pIst
pst (1  uit)

Eit
Bit + Eit

LDt +

Bit
Bit + Eit

(1  uit) IRt
 p
I
s;t+1
pIst
+ (1  uit) it
# (20)
where Bit is the sum of long and short term liabilities, Eit is own funds,
IRt is a weighted average of bank lending rates with maturities over one
year, LDt is the one year benchmark t-bill rate, uit is the e¤ective tax rate,
pIst is the industry specic investment price index, pst is the industry specic
price deator (PPI or GDP deator, depending on industry) and it is the
e¤ective depreciation rate as dened in the previous section.
Since the rm nances its investment using both external funds
(Bit= (Bit + Eit)) and internal funds (Eit= (Bit + Eit)), the user cost of capital
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is determined by the interest rates of borrowed funds, the return on equity
and the shares of these sources of capital components in the rms liabilities.
Opposed to the theoretical formula where the denominators contain physical
capital, we used the sum of external and internal funds in our calculations.
This is justied by the fact that the optimal rate of external funds depending
on tax advantages is a function of the accounting leverage.
The return on equity was proxied using benchmark t-bill rates. This
obviously underestimates the cost of own funds. Namely, it is standard that
the expected rate of return on a risky project is greater than the risk free
rate. The di¤erence between the two is the risk premium. However, the risk
premium is di¢ cult to measure so for the sake of simplicity we consider the
benchmark rate as a proxy for the opportunity cost of equity.17
The cost of borrowed funds are generally measured by the interest paid.
Calculating an apparent interest rate, which is the ratio of interest paid and
total stock of debt, would be evident. However, there is no separated data for
debt in the rmsliability stock prior to 1999. Dividing interest paid by the
sum of short and long term liabilities signicantly underestimates the real
interest burden18, which demonstrates the huge share of non-interest bearing
liabilities (e.g. accounts payable) within overall liabilities. Consequently, we
used the weighted average of bank lending rates assuming all the rms can
borrow at similar conditions.
17Three year rates are only available since 1996, the ve year rates since 1997 and the
most compelling ten year rate since 1999. Therefore we used the one year benchmark rate
uniformly between 1992 and 2002.
18The variable created in this fashion oscillated between 4 and 6% on average.
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7 Estimation and results
7.1 Estimation method
Our rst model based on eq. (14) was the ADL(2,1) in levels of the log of
the capital stock:
kit =
2X
p=1
!pki;t p+
1X
q=1
qqi;t q+
1X
q=1
quci;t q+
1X
q=1
CFi;t q
pIs;t qKi;t q 1
+i+t+"it
where "it is a white noise term, uncorrelated across rms and in time.
Individual e¤ects are stochastic so both the lags of capital and the other
variables can be correlated to i. Because of the endogeneity problem, some
transformation is needed to get rid of these individual e¤ects.
The well-known within estimator handles this with mean-di¤erencing but
it will still produce inconsistent parameter estimates in the presence of lagged
dependent variables and other endogeneity problems, particularly in panels
with short time period. The lag of the mean-di¤erenced dependent variable
~ki;t 1 = ki;t 1   (T   2) 1
PT 1
s=1 kis

and the mean-di¤erenced error term
~"it = "it   (T   2) 1
PT
s=2 "is

are by all means correlated. If (!1 > 0),
the term   (T   2) 1 kit in the former and the term "it in the latter are
negatively correlated and, also, the term ki;t 1 and the term  (T   2) 1 "i;t 1
are negatively correlated. These negative correlations suppress the positive
correlation between other terms (  (T   2) 1 ki;t 1 and  (T   2) 1 "i;t 1, for
example). As a result, the overall negative correlation between ~ki;t 1 and ~"it
leads to signicantly underestimated within parameter estimate of the lagged
dependent variable (Nickell (1981)).
From Nickell (1981) we know that the inconsistently estimated parameter
of the lagged dependent variable impacts the parameter estimates of the
other variables as well. The direction of the bias depends on the sign of
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and other explanatory
variables. Continuing to assume that (!1 > 0), if this correlation is positive
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the parameter estimate of the other explanatory variable is biased downwards
and vice versa.
The endogeneity of explanatory variables give rise to inconsistency of the
estimates, too. A shock to the capital stock a¤ects the rms output because
it is clear from the production technology specication that a positive shock
to the capital stock causes output to increase. A capital shock also might
modify the cost of capital. A change in the capital stock might alter the
leverage of the rm and, according to eq. (4) the bank lending rate and the
user cost. Taking these factors into account, the endogeneity of cash-ow
cannot be ruled out because a rmss cash-ow is a positive function of sales
revenue. However, cash-ow and leverage are negatively correlated. These
e¤ects do not necessarily cancel out each other but the direction of the bias
cannot be foreseen.
Individual e¤ects can be eliminated by rst di¤erencing as well. As op-
posed to the within transformation, the error term values for every time
period do not appear in the equation in this case and the strict exogeneity of
explanatory variables is not required. In the case of dynamic panel data mod-
els, however, OLS estimation on rst di¤erences of variables still produces
inconsistent parameter estimates. This is because the lagged dependent vari-
able (ki;t 1) and the di¤erenced error term ("it) are negatively correlated,
which comes from the opposite sign of the (t  1) terms. This negative cor-
relation causes the parameter estimate of the lagged dependent variable to
be biased downwards with the extent being generally higher than that of the
within estimates.
Consistent parameter estimates can be obtained using appropriate instru-
ments for the endogenous variables. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggests the
rst di¤erenced two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. Maintaining the
initial assumption that there is no autocorrelation in the disturbance term
and assuming that the capital stock and all the explanatory variables are
uncorrelated to future disturbances, lags (t  2) and earlier of the variables
both levels and di¤erences are all valid instruments. Empirical research
showed, however, that using levels of variables as instruments produce gen-
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erally more e¢ cient estimates than di¤erences. Another advantage of using
level instruments is that we do not lose additional observations due to lagged
di¤erencing, that is, we have more instruments given the number of observa-
tions.
Also, lagged values of the employment level were used as possible excluded
instruments. Since labour is one of the main determinants of production, the
number of people employed is a suitable candidate. However, the two in-
put factors are evidently interrelated and thus present labour usage may
be correlated with the error term, which violates the orthogonality condi-
tion. Moreover, some recent empirical research have documented signicant
dynamic interrelation between the two input factors (Dixit (1997)). This
means that the correlation between the demand for capital and the demand
for labour is not restricted to one period but adjustment dynamics in one
factor a¤ect adjustment in the other factor over a period of more than one
year. The fact that labour adjustment may precede investment implies that
lagged employment is also correlated with the present error term. Never-
theless, it is reasonable to assume that this correlation does not hold if the
time span between investment and labour decisions is large enough. There-
fore, we assume that the error term in t is uncorrelated with employment
in (t  2) and earlier, which means that present investment decisions do not
a¤ect rms labour policy two years before. Consequently, the level of em-
ployment in (t 3) and earlier are possible instruments as well. Evidently, the
validity of these instruments was tested using appropriate statistical methods
("di¤erence-in-Hansen test"), just as the validity of the other instruments
used in the regressions.
7.2 Econometric results
We summarized our estimation results of the rst specication in Table 3.
The parameter estimates of the Within estimator (rst two columns) ap-
pear to be signicant for all variables. However, as we mentioned earlier,
we know that the parameter estimate of the lagged dependent variable is bi-
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ased downwards because of the incorrect assumption of strict exogeneity. In
spite of the downward bias, the magnitude of the parameter estimate (0.609)
of the lagged dependent variable points to quite high persistence in capital
stock dynamics. The estimates of both sales and user cost parameters are
of the expected sign. This is also true for cash-ow. However, the magni-
tude of cash-ow parameter estimates shows that rms investment is not
highly sensitive to the nancial position. The results obtained using First-
di¤erenced estimates (second and third columns) are, by and large, in line
with the Within estimates. There are two di¤erences, though. First, in line
with the theoretical considerations, it is apparent that the parameter esti-
mate of the lagged dependent variable is more downward biased (0.18) than
the within estimate. Second, the parameter estimate of lagged sales is of
higher magnitude in this estimation.
In the 2SLS estimates, we instrumented endogenous variables by all the
available observations for each variable back to time (t  5) in order to im-
prove the accuracy of our estimations.19 However, we found that including
lag (t  2) of sales resulted in invalid instrument matrices, so we used (t  3)
to (t  5) lags of this variables as instruments. One can argue in favour of
omitting lags (t  2) of this variable that, for example, current output is
correlated with future output, that is, current output can be interpreted as
a proxy for future demand conditions. Therefore, an investment shock in
time t is correlated with lagged output. Of course, this implies that ear-
lier lags of sales might also be somewhat correlated with the current capital
stock. However, we found that using lags (t  3) and earlier as instruments
did not result in categorically invalidating the instrument matrix and can be
accepted as valid instruments. Also, employment (t  3) to (t  5) were used
as excluded instruments (see consideration above). The use of employment
as instrument improves signicantly the accuracy of our estimates without
violating the orthogonality condition. As a result, the marginal signicance
level of the Hansen J-statistic in our nal specication was 0.062, the absence
19Since cash-ow contains lagged capital in the denominator, we xed the maximal
number of lags used as instrument to four in order to save observations. Therefore, we
"only" lose two years in the estimation comparing to the simple FD estimator.
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of correlation between the di¤erenced error term and the instrument matrix
could not be rejected at 5% signicance level. Based on the AR2 test for
second order serial correlation in the residuals, we could not reject the null of
zero serial correlation.20 Moreover, diagnostic tests and parameter estimates
seemed to be robust to changes in the lag structure used in the instrument
matrix.
The 2SLS parameter estimate of (logKi;t 1) is 0.71, which is higher than
the one obtained in either Within or First-di¤erence estimation. This rela-
tively high persistence in the capital stock is in line with our expectations.
However, the parameter of the second lag of capital was not signicantly
di¤erent from zero. This suggest that only the lag (t  1) plays a role in
the adjustment process of capital. 2SLS results show that the sensitivity
of capital stock with respect to contemporaneous sales is higher (0.5) than
previous biased estimates. The parameter of lagged sales did not appear to
be statistically di¤erent from zero.
The estimate of the contemporaneous user cost parameter is statistically
signicant. The order of magnitude (-0.223) suggests that user cost changes
are important determinants of corporate investment. This provides evidence
against simple sales-accelerator models that include only sales and exclude
user costs. The lagged parameter estimate (-0.016) is lower in absolute value
than that of time t and almost signicant at usual signicance levels. As is
generally the case in the empirical literature, the cash-ow capital ratio enters
the equations with a signicantly positive sign. Contemporaneous cash-ow
has a greater e¤ect on current investment, while the signicance level of past
values of cash-ow is much higher than that of current cash ow.
20If the AR(2) test showed nonzero correlation, the consistency of the Anderson-Hsiao
estimates would be called into question. This is because the second order serial correlation
of di¤erenced error terms means that (t  2) shocks are reected in the capital level at
time t and hence second lags of the endogenous variables would not be orthogonal to the
di¤erenced error term.
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These parameter estimates imply long run coe¢ cients that provide some
interesting empirical ndings.21 The long run coe¢ cient of sales is practically
unity which provides evidence for constant returns to scale in the produc-
tion function.22 This surprising result was robust across specications, as
will be seen later. However, one has to exercise care in interpreting this as
straightforward evidence because we are using sales as a proxy for output.
The long run user cost parameter23 estimate appears to be quite high (-0.828)
compared to other estimates. At a glance, it seems to be a high elasticity
compared to certain former estimates: estimating a comparable model on
French manufacturing data, Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) have found this co-
e¢ cient to be (-0.16)-(-0.311). Nevertheless, it is not completely out of line
with previous results because Chatelain and Teurlai (2004) estimated this
elasticity to be even higher for small service sector rms. The nding that
our estimated user cost elasticity is below unity implies that the assumption
of Cobb-Douglas technology would not have been appropriate in our case.
In the second specication, the ratio of net investment with respect to
capital is regressed on a set of variables (see equation (15) for a detailed
presentation). We present only the consistent parameter estimates hereafter.
Diagnostics indicated that this specication was more sensitive to the choice
of the instrument matrix than the previous specication (Table 4). This in-
stability was also reected in point estimates. We proceeded choosing the
instrument matrix in the same manner as we have done in the previous spec-
ication and chose all available lags back to (t  5) as instruments. However,
instead of lags of the investment ratio, we used the lagged levels of capital
(logK) as instruments in the nal model because the specication performed
21Nevertheless, it has to be stressed again that some caution is needed when interpret-
ing these coe¢ cients. We noted earlier when we dened long run coe¢ cients that ADL
parameters may include e¤ects of changes in expectations and technology and they do not
necessarily embody only the adjustment characteristics of variables.
22See the coe¢ cient of output in equation 11 describing the long run demand for capital.
It can be seen that if the coe¢ cient of output is unity then this implies the returns-to-scale
parameter to be unity as well.
23Which is, in the context of our model, also the estimate of the elasticity of substitution
between production factors.
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better in terms of diagnostics. The Hansen-J statistics marginal signicance
level was 0.084. The AR(2) structure of the residuals can easily be rejected
based on the test.
Regarding persistence, we note that it is not the parameter of the lagged
investment ratio but that of the logKt 2 that determines the true capital
persistence in this specication (see equation (15)). Although the appar-
ent auto-regressive parameter is (!1   1), the underlying auto-regressive
component remains (!1 + !2). Therefore, the persistence parameter can be
obtained by adding 1 to the estimated parameter of logKt 2. With a value
of 0.47, this specication implies lower persistence for the capital stock than
the one obtained in the level estimation (0.71).
The contemporaneous sales parameter is estimated to be over unity (1.38)
in this specication while the lagged is negative (-0.83), both being signi-
cantly di¤erent from zero and greater in absolute terms than in the previous
specication. However, the long run elasticity is still practically unity. This
corroborates the nding of constant returns to scale, which emerged from
the level estimation. Yet, the relatively high and opposite sign short run
elasticities can hardly be interpreted as a plausible adjustment process.
The user cost elasticities (-0.38 and -0.03) are signicant and greater in
absolute terms compared to the level estimation results. However, due to
lower persistence, the long run coe¢ cient (-0.83) is comparable in magnitude
to the previous result. For cash-ow, both parameters are signicantly di¤er-
ent from zero and greater than previously obtained elasticities. As a result,
the long run coe¢ cient of cash-ow is also greater (0.43) than it was in the
level estimation (0.23). The greater sensitivity is not necessarily implausible
because cash-ow might take up the e¤ects of protability expectations and
future sales since output and cash-ow are correlated.
In sum, this specication was less stable and these results are slightly less
plausible than those obtained using the level equation.
The third specication regresses the investment ratio on di¤erences and
lagged di¤erences of sales, user cost and the level of cash-ow. This speci-
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cation proved to be much more robust to di¤erent instrument matrices: the
orthogonality of instruments could be accepted in all cases (Table 4). The
marginal signicance level of the Hansen-J statistic of our nal instrument
set is 0.21, this same value for the AR(2) test is 0.59.
Capital persistence in this specication is determined by the sum of es-
timated lagged dependent variable parameters. In this case persistence is
valued to be 0.58, which is comparable to but lower than that of the level
estimation (0.71) being still higher than in the second specication (0.47).
Although having the same signs as in the second specication, sales para-
meter estimates are lower in absolute terms (0.78 and -0.352) than those in
the second specication (1.375 and -0.826). This suggests parameters can be
more plausibly interpreted as adjustment process characteristics. The long
run coe¢ cient of sales is robustly close to unity again. The user cost para-
meters are slightly higher in absolute value (-0.285 and -0.036) but still close
to those produced in the level estimation (-0.223 and -0.016). The long run
coe¢ cient in this specication was close to those obtained by the two other
specications (-0.76). Regarding cash-ow, the contemporaneous parameter
estimate is not statistically di¤erent from zero, but the lagged cash-ow ap-
pears to have signicant explanatory power. This reinforces what one might
have suspect already looking at the signicance levels obtained in the previ-
ous estimations, mainly in the rst specication.
To summarize, we believe that our overall sample estimation results are
plausible. The parameter estimates are of the expected sign and magnitude.
To put results in an international context, we compare long run coe¢ cients
from the third specication to what Angeloni et al. (2002) estimated using
data for Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Despite di¤erences, our para-
meter estimates are not out of line with those of Angeloni et al. (2002).24
24These di¤erences might account for the disparities of results. First, their database
contained mostly manufacturing data. Second, they have beneted from a longer time
span (1983-99) of their database letting them use earlier lags both in the ADL structre and
as instruments in the estimation. Third, they assert that their sample is biased towards
larger rms. This might also be true for our sample but it is hard to assess whether
the bias itself causes parameters to be inacceptably out of line with expectations. Last,
42
7. Estimation and results
Table 3: Estimation results - Specication 1
dependent variable: log capital (logKt)
coef. Z stats. coef. Z stats. coef. Z stats.
logKt-1 0.609 238.65 0.181 69.02 0.710 12.85
logKt-2 0.056 23.31 0.105 42.55 0.001 0.10
logQt 0.157 72.98 0.161 72.68 0.500 2.76
logQt-1 0.035 15.58 0.100 43.24 -0.207 -1.54
logUCt -0.492 -191.63 -0.375 -154.22 -0.223 -2.95
logUCt-1 -0.003 -3.10 -0.030 -27.57 -0.016 -1.56
CFt/Kt-1 0.035 76.60 0.029 65.54 0.053 1.82
CFt-1/Kt-2 0.015 32.94 0.017 40.22 0.013 2.61
Long-run coef. of sales 0.574 91.82 0.366 81.38 1.013 6.09
Long-run coef. of user cost -1.480 -130.63 -0.567 -115.85 -0.828 -3.36
Long-run coef. of cash-flow 0.152 57.27 0.065 54.66 0.229 1.58
Hansen J statistic 16.26 P=0.062
AR2 test 1.00 P=0.317
Wald test for year dummies 5684.16 P=0.000 4927.81 P=0.000 54.25 P=0.000
Source: Apeh 1993-2002
Instruments for 2SLS estimation: second to fifth lags of capital and user cost, second to fourth
lags of cash-flow, third to fifth lags of sales and employment.
First-differencedWithin
Anderson-Hsiao
2SLS
Notes: Capital, sales and cash-flow measured in thousands of HUF. Cash-flow deflated by
sectoral investment price index (own estimation), sales deflated by sectoral PPI for industry
and GDP deflator for agriculture and services. Year dummies included. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors estimates. Long-run standard errors were computed using "delta
method" (see e.g. Wooldridge (2001), pp. 44)
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Table 4: Estimation results - Specications 2 and 3
dependent variable: net investment rate ( Ît /K t-1 )
coef. Z stats. coef. Z stats.
Ît-1/Kt-2 -0.352 -3.86 0.595 6.50
Ît-2/Kt-3 -0.016 -1.49
logKt-2 -0.531 -3.85
logQt 1.375 2.59
logQt-1 -0.826 -2.00
logUCt -0.379 -2.07
logUCt-1 -0.028 -1.12
dlogQt 0.781 2.98
dlogQt-1 -0.352 -1.77
dlogUCt -0.285 -2.36
dlogUCt-1 -0.035 -1.95
CFt/Kt-1 0.190 2.92 -0.005 -0.13
CFt-1/Kt-2 0.041 3.93 0.065 3.36
Long-run coef. of sales 1.032 4.76 1.019 5.19
Long-run coef. of user cost -0.765 -2.51 -0.760 -2.60
Long-run coef. of cash-flow 0.433 2.08 0.142 2.64
Hansen J statistic 13.91 P=0.084 10.97 P=0.204
AR2 test 0.12 P=0.905 0.54 P=0.588
Wald test for year dummies 31.77 P=0.000 50.53 P=0.000
Source: Apeh 1993-2002
3rd specification2nd specification
Notes: Capital, sales and cash-flow measured in thousands of HUF.
Cash-flow deflated by sectoral investment price index (own estimation),
sales deflated by sectoral PPI for industry and GDP deflator for
agriculture and services. Year dummies included. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors estimates. Long-run standard errors were
computed using "delta method" (see e.g. Wooldridge (2001), pp. 44)
Instruments for both 2nd and 3rd specification: second to fourth lags of
capital and cash-flow, second to fifth lags of user cost, third to fifth lags
of sales and employment.
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For the user cost, their long run elasticities ranged between (-0.027)-(-0.521),
with the estimate for Germany being the highest and for France being the
lowest. For cash-ow, the estimate fell between (0.079 for Germany)-(0.301
for Italy). It is only the long run parameter of sales that is consistently lower
in their estimation (0.018 for Spain)-(0.387 for Germany).
We carried out estimations also with the "di¤erence-GMM" estimator
suggested by Arrelano and Bond (1991). However, results based on the
entire sample proved to be unstable to the instrument matrix. Heterogeneity
across rms might well explain why these latter results are unstable. Also,
the homogeneity assumption of parameters of other variables in general might
be a question. For example, rm-level heterogeneity might be key from the
point of view of cash-ow e¤ects as larger rms are more likely to be less
nancially constrained than smaller rms. The validity of these hypotheses
is to be tested by splitting the sample but presenting sample split results are
beyond the scope of this paper.
8 Conclusion
We investigated corporate investment behavior in Hungary using non-nancial
rm level data between 1993 and 2002. Using the standard neoclassical
framework we estimated several specications. Assuming that optimal capi-
tal stock adjusts according to an ADL structure, we derived a level equation
for the stock of capital and two equations for the investment-to-capital ratio.
In each empirical equation we used rm specic user cost of capital data
along with sales and cash-ow.
The main ndings of the investigation are the following. Estimations
based on the whole sample show that in the long run the user cost of capital
but not least their specication contains a xed e¤ect even in the di¤erenced equation.
This causes the AR parameters to be smaller because the rm-specic e¤ect takes up the
autoregressive characteristics of investment rate dyamics. To understand what this implies
and what the considerations are behind including/omitting a xed e¤ect in the di¤erenced
equation, see the discussion of the last equation within the section on empirical models.
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is a signicant determinant of investment and the long run sensitivities are,
broadly speaking, in line with previous European estimates. The di¤erence of
results might be, at least partly, explained by sample di¤erences and certain
specication-related issues.
This result invalidates simple sales accelerator models where the only
important determinant of investment is output. We also discuss that there
are mechanisms, though not obvious, through which long term interest rate
changes a¤ect the user cost and, in the end, investment. It has to be stressed,
however, that being essentially partial, this model is not able to describe
the exact mechanism how monetary impulses are transmitted to the cost of
capital and, accordingly, corporate investment.
Another interesting nding of the paper is that the coe¢ cient of output is
robustly close unity, which provides strong evidence for constant returns to
scale in the production function. To control for nancial constrain e¤ects we
added cash-ow to the equations. Results show that the nancial position
of a rm is an important determinant of investment suggesting that credit
channel e¤ects might be at work.
Our results provide the rst set of microeconomic insights to Hungarian
corporate investment behavior. Drawing on these, further investigations,
including splitting the sample and applying more recent frameworks, will be
aimed at depicting a more rened picture of investment behavior in Hungary.
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Appendix
The variables were constructed from tax return and balance sheet data of
double entry book keeping Hungarian companies between 1992 and 2002.
Costs and sales revenues were deated using industry specic production
price deators for manufacturing, energy and mining. For other industries
(agriculture, construction and services) we used industry specic GDP dea-
tors. In calculating rm specic real capital stock we used weighted averages
of domestic sales prices of machinery investment, import prices of machinery
investment and construction investment prices of the industries where the
weights were the domestic, import and construction investment proportions
of each industry. Denitions of the variables are listed below.
Number of employed (L): Average number of employed during the year,
rounded to the nearest integer.
Capital stock (K): The stock of tangible and intangible assets. There is
no data collected for investment in corporate tax returns, hence cap-
ital data cannot be constructed by the generally used version of the
perpetual inventory method (see Section 6.1).
Output (Q): Output is proxied by sales revenues of the rm.
User cost of capital (UC): User cost is dened as (see Section 6.2):
UCit =
pIst
pst
"
Eit
Bit + Eit

LDt +

Bit
Bit + Eit

(1  uit) IRt  
pIs;t+1
pIst
+ (1  uit) it
#
(1  uit)
where:
Bit = The sum of short and long term liabilities. It contains: accounts
payable, liabilities to owners, sum of short term credits and loans,
and other liabilities. Long term liabilities are composed of invest-
ment credits and other credits.
Eit = Equity is calculated: subscribed capital subscribed capital un-
paid + capital reserve + revaluation reserve + prot or loss for
the year + accumulated prot reserve.
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IRt = weighted average of bank lending rates with maturities over one
year
LDt = one year benchmark t-bill rate
uit = e¤ective tax rate
it = e¤ective depreciation rate
 if Iit > 0 : it = DEPit=
 
DEPit + Kit

 if Iit < 0 : it = DEPit= Kit
where DEPit is value of depreciation accounted in year t and
Kit is accounting capital at the end of year t.
Where equity was negative, we assumed (Eit= (Bit + Eit)) = 0 and
(Bit= (Bit + Eit)) = 1. In these cases the user cost is determined
entirely by the cost of external funds.
pst = industry specic price deator (PPI for industry and GDP dea-
tor for agriculture, construction and services)
pIst = industry specic investment price index. As yet, the Hungarian
Central Statistics O¢ ce has not published industry specic price
indices for the period prior to 1999, hence we calculated them as
weighted averages of investment prices of domestic machinery, in-
vestment prices of import machinery investment and construction
investment prices in total economy where the weights were the do-
mestic, import machinery investment and construction investment
proportions of each industry.
Cash ow (CF): Firms cash ow was calculated on the basis of Sched-
ule No. 7 to Act C of 2000 On Accounting. We dened cash-ow as:
Income before taxes + Depreciation write-o¤+ Loss in value and back-
marking Change in trade debtors Change in accrued and deferred
assets Change in inventories + Change in accrued and deferred liabil-
ities + Change in short term liabilities + Change in long term liabilities
+ Change in subscribed capital (corrected for subscr. cap. unpaid) 
Corporate tax paid or payable Dividends and prot sharing paid or
payable.
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